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Neoliberalisation, Fast Policy Transfer and the Management of Labour 
Market Services 
Abstract 
Neoliberalism has been a core concern for IPE for several decades, but is often ill-defined.  
Research offering greater definitional clarity stresses the role of contingent and local level 
factors in diverse processes of neoliberalisation.  This paper contributes to that literature, 
addressing a surprising gap in critical IPE knowledge; the management practices by which 
pressures to activate the unemployed and to make them more competitive, are implemented.  
The paper suggests that performance management, is significant as both a depoliticising policy 
coordination mechanism and a highly politicised policy implementation practice.  The paper 
invokes a scalar-relational approach which sees the pressure to innovate and compete at lower 
scales as driven by the political economy of competitiveness at the system scale.  The paper 
reports on research undertaken within the empirical frame of EU meta-governance, showing 
how performance management is part of lower-scale attempts to adapt to system-scale 
pressures.  It is neoliberalising in both form and content.  It concludes by showing that while 
performance management may be a significant component of neoliberalisation there is scope 
for engagement and contestation motivated by egalitarian ideals.  Critical IPE scholars 
interested in contesting neoliberalisation should therefore engage with the political economy of 





As several papers (Knafo; Eagleton-Pierce) in this Special Issue argue, performance 
management is one of the central technologies of managerialism.  This paper focusses on the 
use of performance management in the management and implementation of Active Labour 
Market Policy (ALMP) in prior debates on the borders of IPE, critical geography, public policy 
and administration. These debates are particularly associated with the process of neo-
liberalisation (Peck et al., 2012), the political economy of scale (Charnock, 2010; Macartney 
& Shields, 2011), depoliticisation and fast policy transfer (Peck & Theodore, 2015).  
Developing the accounts of neoliberalisation through inter-scalar fast policy transfer in the 
work of Peck and others, the paper addresses a gap in current IPE research on the role of 
management practices in implementing neoliberalisation; labour market policies designed to 
induce increased competition for paid employment in the formal labour market.  Despite the 
fact that ALMPs have been widely promoted by key international organisations, and taken up 
by national governments, they have not been a major focus for scholars of IPE. Neither 
managerialism generally (Eagleton-Pierce and Knafo; Sharma and Soederberg, this issue), or 
in the specific context of ALMPs have featured strongly in the IPE literature, despite their 
relevance to core IPE debates.   
 
Understanding management practices are crucial to deepening our knowledge of processes of 
multi-scalar neoliberalisation and have a bearing on the social and political economy outcomes 
of these processes.  The concept of ‘Fast Policy’ in the work of Peck and collaborators might 
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be augmented by a corollary notion of ‘Fast Management’, which also has important inter-
scalar and trans-scalar dynamics.  The first novel contribution of the paper is to address several 
important research questions in the context of neoliberalisation, such as: (1) how do common 
management practices contribute to processes of neo-liberalisation?; (2) What are the 
mechanisms by which these management practices are transferred between and within fluid 
inter-scalar structures?; (3) What are the political economy implications of public management 
and policy implementation techniques?  The paper addresses a gap in IPE research by starting 
to answer these questions in the particular context of the management and implementation of 
ALMP.  
 
This is significant to critical IPE because ALMPs have a substantial influence on the 
relationship between labour supply and demand in particular segments of the skills and income 
distribution. In this sense, management practices have significant scope to affect core concerns 
for political economists such as the distribution of support and discipline in the implementation 
of welfare policy, which in turn influences who offers labour to the market and in what 
conditions.  These management practices therefore affect the balance of power between capital 
and labour, and the ways that policy implementation generates or mitigates ‘social harm’.  
Further, understanding the way management practices do this is of relevance to exploration of 
the relation between micro-scale behaviours in the everyday reproduction of capitalist social 
relations, and structural pressures at the scale of the global economy. 
 
An additional reason that management techniques are significant for IPE, flows directly from 
the assertion that neoliberalisation is a multi-scalar process.  This opens up the local scale of 
policy implementation as an important site of contested, imperfect and contradiction-laden 
political economy.  The paper adds to Peck et al.’s discussion of the scalar relations of 
neoliberalisation with insights from other literatures in public management and social policy 
which emphasise the scope for frontline and ‘street level’ managers to reproduce, but also 
contest and subvert, neoliberalising policy reforms, through their management practices.  This 
discussion helps to better understand the role and consciousness of agents of neoliberalisation 
at the scale of policy implementation, rather than just policy making. It suggests that critical 
IPE scholarship engage directly with management practice as well as big-picture issues of 
structure and policy design.  It helps to better understand the ways that structural processes in 
the international political economy, such as the drive for competitiveness, are reproduced 
through more micro-scale processes.  
 
The paper unfolds in six sections. The first locates the discussion in the specific IPE literature 
on neoliberalisation, scale and Fast Policy transfer, drawing mainly on the work of Peck, 
Brenner and Theodore.  The second makes the case that management techniques and 
technologies which implement ALMPs should be seen as an important aspect of multi-scalar 
neoliberalisation.  The third, documents some of the ways in which these management 
technologies are being spread through horizontal ‘fast management’ within and between scales; 
involving, for instance, transnational engagement between supra-state and sub-state 
institutions.  These management technologies help drive reform agendas between scales.  The 
fourth section documents the role that performance management plays in driving reform 
between scales. The fifth documents the commonly neoliberalising content of performance 
management targets and indicators in relation to ALMPs.  The final section concludes and 
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tentatively suggests critical IPE should see management and managerial processes as sites for 
contesting neoliberalisation.  
Neo-Liberalisation through Multi-Scalar Fast Policy Transfer and 
the Management of Social Harm 
‘Neoliberalism’ is a common focus in IPE research (and the wider social sciences) and usually 
deployed as part of a negative value judgement about the social effects of economic, social and 
political reform (Venugopal, 2015).  Beyond this, it is a term which is frequently undefined, 
ambiguous or elaborated at a very high level of abstraction (Boas & Gans-Morse, 2009).  A 
range of authors have sought to bring greater specificity (Eagleton-Pierce, 2016; Gamble, 2001; 
Harvey, 2005; Overbeek & van der Pijl, 1993). Among those, Brenner, Peck and Theodore 
have perhaps gone furthest and define neoliberalisation (as distinct from neoliberalism) as a 
“politically guided intensification of market rule and commodification” (2010, p. 184) which 
is also ‘variegated’ in that it is “a historically specific, unevenly developed, hybrid, patterned 
tendency of market-disciplinary regulatory restructuring” (Peck et al., 2012, p. 169).  As such, 
neoliberalisation does not result in simple political economy convergence (though patterns of 
convergence are clearly present) but common tendencies are implemented in path-dependent, 
contingent, national and local processes which are subject to struggle and contestation.  Peck 
et al. point to both ‘roll-back’ and ‘roll-out’ strategies which are sometimes destructive and 
sometimes creative and reconstructive of new institutional forms and policy programmes.  
Common to both is the attempt to respond to competition at the system-scale by generating 
place-based competitiveness at lower scales.  This understanding of neoliberalisation is useful 
for the current paper because of the focus on scale and scalar-relations, and the emphasis on 
policy transfer.   
 
A focus on the global political economy of scale draws attention to the ways in which one scale 
– that of world market integration – is becoming ‘ecologically dominant’ (Jessop, 2012, p. 202); 
predetermining problems and processes at other scales.  Thus, the systemic property of 
competitiveness at the world market scale drives the imperative of competition to lower scales, 
with important feedback effects. Prescriptions for how to facilitate competitiveness at lower 
scales (for e.g. macro-regions, nation-states, regions, cities, firms, households and individuals 
and so on) are both a product and an ideology of this ecological dominance, helping to mystify 
the need to compete as an inevitable outcome of inexorable processes. As actors at all scales 
respond to the imperative to compete, they further reinforce and strengthen that imperative for 
other actors and at other scales (Nunn, 2015; Nunn & Beeckmans, 2015; Nunn & White, 2017). 
The imperative to compete then should not be read as a simple top-down pressure but one which 
is reproduced by the interplay of structure and even very small scale agency.  Furthermore, the 
imperatives of these global scale pressures are frequently anticipated and promoted subjectively 
by lower scale reformers, even ahead of material pressures which might necessitate this (Hay 
& Rosamond, 2002; Tsarouhas & Ladi, 2013). 
 
Management technologies have a key role to play in the coordination of economic, political 
and social agency between scales, as ‘inter-scalar rule regimes’ and in the mutually-reinforcing 
pressures moving between structure and small scale agency.  Performance management, 
benchmarking, quality standards and the like are central to efforts to maintain control between 
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scales in large corporate structures.  They augment ‘depoliticisation’ (Burnham, 2001; Flinders 
& Buller, 2006); making system scale characteristics such as the imperative to compete appear 
to be natural.  Policy makers and public managers attempting to cope with the challenges 
presented by these characteristics inevitably see lower scales as sites of adaptation to global 
scale pressures and the use of depoliticising management technologies helps to insulate these 
scalar relations from everyday political questioning. 
 
However, in a system where competitiveness is a wired-in characteristic, many efforts to adapt 
to the system at lower scales (such as states, regions, cities, neighbourhoods, and ultimately 
households and individuals) must inevitably fail. But as Peck and Theodore note (2001, p. 432), 
neoliberalising reforms often ‘fail forward’; the generalised characteristic of competitiveness 
mandates that the route out of failure is to further embed and internalise competitiveness.  
Failure is inevitable both because of the simple reality that not every place can win 
simultaneously, but also because winning and losing creates complex effects.  Failure creates 
poverty and inequality among the losers, harming people and places and their capacity to 
compete in the future.  At the individual and household scale, even winners increasingly find 
themselves in subjective insecurity as they worry about their future chances of success (Berardi, 
2009; Schneider, 2018).  Moreover, neoliberalising reforms often create the need for other 
measures to offset their damaging social effects, further complicating the environment in which 
local innovations take place.  These other measures might entail disciplining, subduing and 
containing surplus populations unable to play their part in individualised competitiveness 
(Wacquant, 2009).   
 
The imperative to compete, and the reality of frequent failure, mean that lower level policy 
makers and implementers must continuously look for innovations in their attempts to adapt to 
these systemic characteristics and to cope with and manage the uncertainty they confront. The 
adoption of managerial solutions helps to offer lower scale policy managers guidance in how 
to do this. Lower-scale innovations deemed as successful are frequently elevated through inter-
scalar linkages, up-scaled or transferred across scales as exemplar projects to be copied and 
iteratively innovated upon. National, middle and local level managers are often drawn into 
transnational expert networks by international organisations wanting to promote policy 
learning, across and between scales (Peck & Theodore, 2010, p. 172).  Networks involving sub-
state bureaucracies, quasi-autonomous delivery bodies, private providers of public services and 
international organisations become an important means of transferring practice often without 
the involvement of state scale politicians; adding to the depoliticising dynamic.  Policy experts, 
consultants, ‘policy pedlars’ (Peck & Theodore, 2010, p. 170) and international organisations 
take on a key role in the transfer of policy models between and across scales, as Seabrooke and 
Sending (this volume) demonstrate. This is one reason why Peck and collaborators eschew 
rationalist political science interpretations of policy transfer to identify instead the socially 
constructed processes which underpin ‘fast policy’ development (Peck & Theodore, 2015, p. 
xxiv–xxvii, 18-30). International organisations and transnational expert networks act as vectors 
for the transfer of favoured policy ideas, technocratic solutions and implementation processes 
(Van der Pijl, 1998, p. 162).  Once again though, this is not simple convergence around 
universal policies and programmes, but endless policy and programme adaptation at 
subordinate scales from the national to the very local.  Through this, even low-level managers 
take on additional roles as translators and innovators in policy and programme delivery to meet 
local contexts and to overcome policy failure. They are incentivised to engage with innovative 
 5 
delivery patterns through management processes that incite competition in their roles, the need 
to renew short-term contracts and pay.  This is ‘fast’ in the sense that policy ideas change and 
are iterated rapidly in preference to long-term, stable and ‘big picture’ policy programmes.  The 
preference for fast over ‘slow’ policy creates a further inbuilt pressure for more Fast Policy.  
State retrenchment sees the withdrawal of longer-term policies and welfare rights, creating a 
replacement demand for time limited and more piecemeal interventions, with a frequently 
experimental character. ‘Speed-up’ is not just an economic imperative among competing firms, 
but also a key feature of neoliberalising governance forms and policy development. 
 
All this has significant political economy outcomes; again at multiple scales.  At the scale of 
the national economy the way in which management processes operate can help to form what 
institutionalist theorists call complementarities (Jackson & Deeg, 2008) between households, 
firms and institutions, in relation to labour supply/demand; pay bargaining; skills and 
technology development.  Such complementarities shape the relative productivities and 
competitiveness of national economies; helping to distribute costs and benefits between states, 
within the world capitalist system.  At a lower scale, within the national economy, the effect of 
these management practices on shaping the discipline applied to individual jobseekers helps to 
shape the costs and benefits arising from the relative successes or failures of individuals, 
households and communities to sell their labour power.  Critical IPE scholars tend to focus on 
the role of neoliberalisation in generating negative outcomes for labour relative to capital.  
Criminologists have coined the term ‘social harm’ (Hillyard & Tombs, 2007; Pemberton, 2016) 
to think about the relative distribution of harm from structural economic, social and political 
processes.  The imposition of the discipline to compete, the costs of failures to do so and 
differential exposure to state discipline as a result of this, might all be thought of as social harm 
in the form of the poverty, ill health, lower life expectancies and criminalisation that result for 
those who disproportionately face the costs of competition and failure.  The experience of 
public services may clearly mitigate or reinforce the social harm resulting from the unequal and 
exploitative relation between capital and labour.  Management processes have a great deal of 
influence over whether public services, like employment services, mitigate or reinforce social 
harm. 
 
This understanding of neoliberalisation, scalar-relations, ‘fast policy’ transfer, repeated failure 
and the generation or mitigation of social harm has three implications for the discussion here 
which are underemphasised in the work of Peck, Brenner, Theodore et al..  First, management 
techniques are used to coordinate policy making between scales.  Second, management 
practices as well as policies travel.  Third, management techniques in policy implementation 
take on central importance to the messy and contradiction-laden realities of neoliberalisation 
‘on the ground’.  The importance of ‘making policy work’ and managing the risk of failure in 
complex environments has long been recognised in the public management literature on street 
level bureaucrats (Lipsky 1980; Brodkin 2011) and frontline policy ‘subversion’ (Barnes & 
Prior, 2009; Dobson, 2015).  Policy implementation must confront the messy realities of social 
struggles over policy outcomes as both frontline staff and service ‘beneficiaries’ come up 
against important contradictions of neoliberalising reform.  For example, the reality for many 
jobseekers is a lack of suitable employment or a mismatch between individual skills and 
capacities (often depleted by the experience of poverty and prior social harm) and the 
availability of work.  In this context, in some places and time periods, frontline staff have 
subverted policy goals.  Performance management is one means of attempting central control 
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to offset these tendencies. 
 
This has curious implications for understanding depoliticisation and agency.  Depoliticisation 
both blurs the lines between policy making and management, and inverts their relation.  In 
many ways, depoliticisation enshrines neoliberalisation as policy objective, rendering policy 
making as a managerial process.  At the same time, policy implementation becomes replete with 
politicised challenges associated with the legitimation of, and overcoming opposition (passive 
and active) to, the decidedly in-egalitarian political economy content of neoliberalising policy.  
It often focusses on the task of ‘contingent coping’ (Hargreaves et al., 2018). with the lower 
level inconsistencies and problems that are thrown up, but always in ways that are constrained 
by system-level imperatives. 
Neo-Liberalising Management Practices in Active Labour Market 
Policy  
ALMPs were central to early IPE critiques of neoliberalisation, often under the label of 
‘workfare’.  For instance, Jessop’s (1993, 1995) formulation of the shift from Keynesian 
Welfare to a Schumpeterian Workfare state emphasised the “subordination of social policy to 
the demands of labour market flexibility and structural competitiveness”.  Cerny (1997) 
emphasised the transition from a welfare to ‘competition state’ in which public policy became 
less about protecting citizens from market discipline and more about exposing them to it. 
Workfare has also remained a central theme in Peck’s elaboration of the messy processes of 
neoliberalisation. In the generalised context of competitiveness, ‘activation’ drives the systemic 
character of competitiveness to lower scales, with households and individuals being the 
ultimate scale of coping with competition and the risks of failure (Peck, 2002, p. 343).  This 
critique of workfare remains central to the critical social policy literature (Grover, 2012; Piggott 
& Grover, 2009; e.g. Slater, 2012).   
 
ALMPs have certainly followed a ‘Fast Policy’ trajectory of being spread through promotion 
by international organisations (e.g. the OECD, EC) and leading neoliberal states such as the 
UK, despite the relatively mixed evidence of their effectiveness overall and regarding different 
types of ALMP (Filges et al. 2015).  For instance, key international organisations tend to 
support the notion that ALMPs which focus more on pressure to activate the unemployed (so 
called ‘services and sanctions’ approaches) (Martin and Grubb, 2001; Martin, 2015) are more 
effective than those involving more substantive training, regardless of evidence that this 
calculation results from short-term measurement horizons (Blasco & Rosholm, 2010; Lechner 
et al., 2011).  Despite all this, ALMPs have not received sustained attention in the more 
mainstream IPE literature since the early 2000s. While Peck et al. focussed on ALMPs in their 
initial studies of fast policy and neoliberalisation, their focus has moved on since and did not 
focus on detailed aspects of ALMP implementation. Further, a quick search of the RIPE archive 
is illustrative in that it reveals virtually no papers that focus explicitly on ‘Active Labour1 
Market Policy’ or ‘Workfare’, with the possible exception of Mahon (2011) and, more 
tenuously, Le Baron (2010).  Mahon’s paper offers a useful discussion of the role of the OECD 
                                                     
1 The search utilised both the American and British spelling of Labor, also the acronym ‘ALMP’ 
and ‘workfare’ and ‘work-fare’ were both used.  
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in promoting ALMPs overtime and the role of internal differences between different 
departments about the particular framing and types of ALMP that should be promoted.  
LeBaron’s paper is an excellent contribution to debates on social reproduction, but does not 
offer detailed insights into ALMPs specifically. Similar searches of other major IPE journals 
reveal a similar gap in the specifically IPE literature.   
 
If ALMPs are relatively rarely explored in IPE, the management practices associated with them 
are even more of a silence (Peters, 2012).  Again illustrative of this, is that a further search of 
the RIPE archive reveals no papers explicitly focussing on ‘Performance Management’2 or 
‘PESs’, and while ‘Public Management’ returns a much larger number of papers (59), only a 
handful (e.g. Bevir, 2003; Peters, 2012) qualify when their abstracts and full text are reviewed.  
Even in social policy, there is only a small and emergent literature on this topic (e.g. Borghi & 
Van Berkel, 2007; Van Berkel & Borghi, 2008; Van Berkel, 2010; Van Berkel & Van der Aa, 
2012; Weishaupt, 2010, 2011), and these studies tend not to fully elaborate the political 
economy implications of policy implementation. This lack of IPE coverage is surprising for 
several reasons.  Performance management practices by which social policies such as ALMPs 
are steered and implemented, are themselves subject to transfer practices which echo ‘fast 
policy’ (‘fast management’, perhaps).  Further, the ways that management practices shape the 
implementation of policy have significant political economy implications; they organise the 
delivery of (and often eligibility for) welfare transfer payments and structure the relationship 
between capital and labour, especially toward the bottom of the income distribution. They 
might also reveal the real as opposed to rhetorical objectives behind particular policies in terms 
of their content (i.e. the intention that what is measured will be what is done). Their adaptation 
in frontline service delivery might reveal the actual political economy outcomes of policy 
implementation; or put simply; ‘who gets what’ (Brodkin, 2011). In sum, management practice 
in the implementation of policy can influence the unequal structure of benefit and harm in 
capitalist societies; it is therefore an important aspect in domestic political economy.  Because 
such management practices are transferred between and within states, they are also a significant 
element of the international political economy. 
 
Eagleton-Pierce (this volume) argues that managerialism is an “adaptable set of ‘social 
technologies’ that are appropriated for a range of governing purposes”.  As several papers in 
this Special Issue (Knafo; Eagleton Pierce) suggest, performance management is a central 
element of the managerialist toolkit, often associated with the New Public Management (NPM) 
which is itself commonly regarded as a broader management doctrine for neoliberalisation 
(Nunn, 2010; Peters, 2012). Knafo (this volume) contests this view, suggesting that the 
application of the NPM was more about strengthening the position and control of top managers 
than representing a neoliberal preference for markets and efficiency.  Yet, it is not clear that 
these are mutually exclusive ideas and the NPM can be interpreted as an attempt to maintain 
centralised control, at the same time as decentralising the delivery and production of public 
services, themselves directed toward neoliberal social ends.  Indeed, one of the functions of 
performance management processes is an attempt to maintain central direction of these social 
ends, where frontline delivery of them must confront the messy and contradiction-laden reality 
                                                     
2 Remarkable given the proliferation of the term in literature more generally (Eagleton-Pierce, 
2017:138). 
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of neoliberal reform on the ground.  The NPM includes a preference for the separation of the 
state from the production of public goods and the delivery of public services via competitive 
market-based arrangements (Dunleavy & Hood, 1994; OECD, 1994; Osborne & Gabler, 1992; 
Whitfield, 1992, 2001). Privatisation may be the ultimate stylised form, but the incitement of 
competition between and/or within public sector providers or ‘mixed markets’ of public and 
private providers is also a feature.  Following this logic, the NPM also attempted to transfer 
management practices from the private to the public sector.  The emergence of large corporate 
structures in the US in the early 20th century renewed the importance of controlling and 
motivating workers in large complex systems (Eagleton-Pierce, 2017; p137-141) and the 
separation of ownership and control (Berle and Means, 1932) led to practices of ‘Management 
by Objectives’ (Drucker, 1955) to coordinate internal supply chains and reliance on external 
suppliers and contractors.  The NPM attempted to copy these practices in the public sector, 
enabling centralised decision making to retain control even in the context of the withdrawal of 
the state from direct provision of goods and services.  
 
Performance management sits within the NPM not just as a distinct component, but as an ‘inter-
linking practice’ (Nunn, 2010) which knits other parts of the ever evolving neoliberalising 
management toolkit together across scales in patterns of ‘delegated governance’ (Dommett & 
Flinders, 2015) where the central state attempts to retain control of decentralised service 
delivery networks.  For example, outcome targets and measures can act as ‘rule regimes’ which 
shape and constrain practice in privatised, decentralised and arms-length producers of public 
services.  Even within the state, this is an inter-scalar practice.  Political authority at one scale 
can operate at others indirectly in a ‘steering but not rowing’ capacity via setting outcome or 
output targets and indicators to guide management practice at lower scales.  National policy 
makers set targets and indicators which they hope will determine what local managers should 
achieve, but give them flexibility about precisely how they might do this in the interests of both 
general effectiveness but also often competition too (Brodkin, 2011).  As we shall see, 
performance management is also cast at the transnational scale and acts to enforce 
neoliberalising transfers of management practice which, to borrow and paraphrase Carroll’s 
(2012) well put formulation, are organised ‘in, through and around the state’. 
 
The NPM can also be associated with ‘depoliticisation’ (Burnham, 2001) as state managers 
retained control through setting high level objectives but thereafter, the provision of public 
services is presented as a largely technical and managerial process rather than as a politicised, 
economic and social one.  Depoliticization helps to insulate central decision makers from 
critique about the experience of policy delivery.  The actuality, of course, is somewhat different, 
as the case of ALMPs amply demonstrates. Services which influence who should get what from 
welfare transfers; and who should offer labour to the market, at what price and under what 
conditions are always highly political. As such, depoliticisation in practice is often a messy and 
contested process, as recent campaigns such as ‘Boycott Workfare’ readily attest.  
 
The following discussion demonstrates the ways in which these management practices are 
themselves neoliberalising in the context of ALMP transfer and implementation.  Performance 
management is drawn on in particular to illustrate this multi-scalar process.  The discussion 
draws specifically on meta-governance processes associated with these performance 
management processes in the EU. The EU is selected for empirical focus for two reasons. First, 
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the processes operating within the EU mean that there is more descriptive empirical evidence 
available on management practices and their transfer within the EU.  Second, and again because 
of these EU-wide processes, the EU is used extensively by non-EU states and international 
organisations as a source of learning for the transfer of management practices.  As an example, 
the RED-SEALC network in Latin America, facilitated by the Inter-American Development 
Bank, often borrows from EU policy and practice learning in shaping advice to PES within 
Latin America.  The EU is therefore a natural focus for the empirical discussion which follows. 
‘Fast Management’ transfer? 
In the EU there are well established meta-governance structures for policy transfer between 
different states.  One of the main strategies to emerge out of concerns about the lack of 
European competitiveness in the early 1990s, was the enduring European Employment 
Strategy, since rolled into the ill-feted Lisbon Strategy and subsequently the ‘European 
Semester’ (Nunn & Beeckmans, 2015).  These multi-scalar meta-governance processes are 
clearly influenced by performance management approaches and encompass often decade-long 
grand objectives, followed by annual rounds of assessing the degree of EU and member-state 
competitiveness, articulating national strategies and reform plans, peer review and 
accountability to the European Commission and measurement of progress in key performance 
indicators.  Within these practices are multiple and often overlapping mechanisms for 
management practice transfer through the Open Method of Coordination – a ‘soft-law’ 
approach relying on peer pressure and bureaucratic procedures like benchmarking and best 
practice exchange (Holman, 2004) to coordinate national policy making rather than the ‘hard-
law’ approach of Regulations and Directives.  One of these is the ‘Mutual Learning 
Programme’ for PESs (as established under article 149 of the Treaty for the European Union) 
which involves a series of formalised activities – usually facilitated by external consultants who 
organise the programme under contract for specified periods.  For example, ICF Consulting3 
organised the programme between 2013-2016 and the programme is now split into two 
contracts with one being organised by ICF and the other by a German firm of consultants called 
ICON4.   
 
The Mutual Learning Programme involves Peer Reviews, Learning Exchanges, Thematic 
Events, a Database of Labour Market Practices and Dissemination Seminars (for an overview 
see ICF, 2016).  Peer Reviews are focussed tightly around a particular topic, and involve PES 
representatives and other experts giving presentations on different aspects of a particular policy 
or management practice.  Participants are usually PES managers at national, regional and local 
level, with lower level managers engaged to give commentary on how they implement policy 
and practice.  Individual ‘experts’ are engaged before and after the event by the main 
consultants who coordinate the programme, to provide research summarising different national 
approaches and commentary on successful ways of transferring ideas and practices (e.g. for 
                                                     
3 ICF is an international consultancy that has been growing over recent years through acquisitions 
and has offices in 67 countries and an annual revenue of over $1.2bn.  It has operated the Mutual Learning 
Programme and similar activities for the EC since 2008.   
4 Icon is based in Cologne with offices in Chile and Abu-Adhabi and an annual workstream of £18m 
in consultancy projects. 
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performance management see Nunn, 2013).  Learning exchanges might follow a Peer Review 
and involve a delegation of managers from different countries visiting a specific PES to 
examine a particular approach in more detail.  Thematic events involve a scheduled series of 
annual meetings (usually two days, held in Brussels) where all or most PES send delegates and 
other organisations are present, such as representatives of the Commission, OECD and the 
International Labor Organization. 
 
These activities cut across and through scales, reaching deep inside the sub-state institutional 
apparatus of member states, often without involving national politicians.  Typically, national 
representatives will be civil servants and managers in arms-length delivery organisations; many 
PES are either separate to the labour ministry (Manoudi, et al., 2014). Where representatives 
of labour ministries are present, they tend to be officials rather than politicians.  As such, these 
policy transfer forums reach around formal political decision making into the sub-state 
bureaucracy and policy implementation process. A recent survey (Weber, 2016) shows that 
between 2013-2016, there were 15 Peer Reviews in 12 countries and including 625 participants; 
14 Learning Exchanges in 12 countries, including 208 participants; and 6 Thematic Events with 
634 participants.   
 
Outputs from these processes include different types of report and a database of good practices. 
Their subject matter is illustrative of a neoliberalising approach to public management.  For 
example, a review of the 147 entries in the most recent database5 reveals that activation and the 
targeting of particular groups within the unemployed are the most frequent topics, with the 
organisation of counselling next and Performance Management being the subject of around 
10% of these reports.  The Commission’s own categorisation of reports from Mutual Learning 
Programme activities reveals that of the 112 reports in the ‘PES Knowledge Centre’ since 2014, 
44 focus on individualisation of service delivery for activation, 30 focus on partnerships, 33 
focus on particular target groups of jobseekers and 45 reports focus on performance 
management.6  Echoing general tendencies to ‘overload’ knowledge production as a strategy 
of power within institutional systems, performance management is the subject of a dizzying 
number of repetitive studies, guides, toolkits and other papers (e.g. see Adamecz, 2013; Bjerre 
& Sidelmann, 2016; Heads of PES, 2013; Nunn, 2012, 2013; Scharle, 2013; Sumpton et al., 
2014; Weishaupt, 2016) designed to spread the practice in EU PES and influence the way it is 
operated, and the take up of particular features such as a focus on employment transitions, the 
speed of these transitions and sub-state institutional and cultures of competition.  
 
These activities also have influence (Weishaupt, 2011).  In the survey (Weber, 2016), 94% of 
respondents from across PES bureaucracies agreed that this activity provided information 
relevant for their work, nearly 80% thought that the events facilitated peer learning and 
exchange of good practice and 70% said that these activities had influenced their work or policy 
development.  Even setting aside positivity bias in such exercises, this suggests that there is a 
degree of policy/practice transfer facilitated through these activities.  Underlining this, over the 
last two decades there has been increasing use of performance management in European PES 
(Mosley at al., 2001; Nunn, 2012) and combine with a range of other reinforcing management 
                                                     
5 See http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1206&langId=en, accessed last on 4/2/2018. 
6 See http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1163&langId=en, accessed last on 4/2/2018. 
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technologies such as the use of datawarehouses and management quality standards (Nunn, 
2013, pp. 18 & Table 7, p49).   
Performance management as inter-scalar rule regime 
Performance management is an important inter-scalar rule regime, extending from macro-
regional meta-governance down to ensuring sub-state institutional – and even individual – 
competition to encourage activation.  At the sub-state scale, performance management 
technologies are now widely used to lock-in competition within sub-state institutional 
structures such as PES.  For example, Datawarehouses are increasingly used to develop 
comparative ‘benchmarking’ practices between sub-national units (e.g. regions, municipalities, 
offices and sometimes individual staff) to encourage competition over key indicators.  The 
sophistication of this comparison and competition varies, but occasionally includes complex 
clustering to compare performance on like terms.  For instance, in Switzerland a summary 
measure is derived from a weighted index of four indicators and interpreted via a complex 
econometric model that seeks to account for exogenous variables such as labour market 
conditions, seasonality, demographics and travel-to-work-area dynamics (Nunn, 2013 Box 3 
and 4).  In Germany, regions are placed into clusters for comparison of performance based on 
their labour market context.  Benchmarking and sharing information between high and low 
performers is encouraged by the Commission, and a ‘toolkit’ for PES (Scharle, 2013) promotes 
sub-national benchmarking as a mechanism to improve performance.  In addition, competition 
is in some cases driven down to the individual advisor level (e.g. Holland, Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Austria and Germany) and is occasionally also associated with financial incentives for 
individuals (e.g. Austria and Germany).   
 
Macro-regional ‘fast management’ mechanisms also embed benchmarking at the supra-
national scale.  One of the current Mutual Learning Programme contracts has been used to 
resurrect a failed attempt at national ‘Benchmarking’ from the mid-2000s (Lehner et al., 2005; 
OSB Consulting & Synthesis Forschung, 2007).  The new contract – focussed on 
‘Benchlearning’ involves an annual process of self-assessment against a series of measures and 
claims (European Network of PES, 2018) some of which are about management processes (e.g. 
‘strategic performance management’) but some of which define the political economy content 
of these (e.g. ‘sustainable activation and management of transitions’).  Criteria and numerical 
scoring are used to place PES in a range of performance categories ranging from ‘mature’, 
through ‘well developed’, ‘developing’ to ‘developable’ (Fertig, n.d.).  The evidence 
underpinning each of these criteria and scoring criteria is mixed and in some cases superficial.  
The pressures induced are to comply with familiar reform agendas including to embed sub-
national institutional competition and to encourage PES to use performance management to 
strengthen individual level competition through the use of financial incentives.  Subsequent to 
self-assessment, PES are visited by a team of assessors who provide a commentary on the self-
assessment.  Assessors are typically external consultants working under a framework for the 
lead consultant on the Benchlearning contract, alongside officials from other countries.  
Comparative reports based on these are produced and discussed at thematic events, to 
encourage further peer pressure and each PES must produce ‘change reports’ based on their 
responses to external assessment and showing how they have implemented the 
recommendations made.  National authorities can, and do, contest some of the findings and 
they can quite easily claim they have met recommendations with semantic alignment of existing 
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reforms (for e.g. see the discussion in (Scharle et al., 2017)).  However, the power of these 
initiatives to influence policy is not their immediate impact but their long-term shaping of the 
narrative and menu from which sub-state bureaucracies choose management practices to 
implement policy.  It is the slow-drip which leads to convergence in management practices.  In 
this sense, reform ideas may frequently fail to take hold, or do so superficially, but following 
the ‘fail forward’ logic, they are resurrected over and again.  
The political economy content of Inter-Scalar ‘Fast Management’  
It is also important to note that these practices tend toward a particular political economy 
content (Bredgaard & Larsen, 2007).  Analysis of the types of objectives encouraged through 
performance management can be particularly revealing for the types of outcomes that policy 
makers desire.  Performance measures can focus on inputs (e.g. money, staff), activities (e.g. 
staff behaviours and processes), outputs (e.g. referral of jobseekers to particular types of 
‘support’), intermediate outcomes (e.g. the transition of jobseekers from unemployment to 
employment) or final outcomes (e.g. the employment/unemployment rate, productivity 
measures and so on) (Nunn, 2012).  Each have their merits and drawbacks with the 
measurement of activities and outputs being associated with a tighter focus on what PES do but 
at the same time being criticised for leading to ‘gaming’ by encouraging the 'creaming' of 
competitive jobseekers for (sometimes costly) interventions they do not need, while 'parking' 
those who might have a low likelihood of finding work but who would benefit from support 
(Bouckaert & Peters, 2002; Bruttel, 2005; Struyven & Steurs, 2005).  One reason for 
continually returning to the theme of performance management in attempts to strengthen the 
implementation of ALMP is to repeatedly try to assert central control over frontline service 
delivery.   
 
Across the EU there has been a convergence in the use of intermediate outcome indicators; 
principally labour market transitions from unemployment, sometimes into employment 
(specific intermediate outcomes), but sometimes simply from unemployment or welfare 
benefits to any other destination (Nunn, 2013, Table 2; Nunn et al., 2010, pp.23–33). Where 
welfare benefits are in place for the unemployed, unspecific outcomes may be problematic in 
that they might encourage PES staff to pressure jobseekers to leave benefits without having 
employment, pushing them into the informal economy or extreme poverty. The film I Daniel 
Blake powerfully draws attention to the ways that these banal management processes might 
drive significant social harm.  In the film, there are several scenes in which the main characters 
have interactions with employment services that discipline their behaviour in ways that are 
highly likely to have been driven by the effects of targets and rules on frontline staff behaviour. 
 
At another level of analysis, the outcomes of such management pressures also underpin 
complementarities.  Where they encourage all jobseekers to find just any work quickly, the 
result is different to where they encourage careful matching of jobseekers to jobs which utilise 
their skills.  It is likely that the first job available to a jobseeker will be less well matched than 
one carefully looked for, and will therefore be of a lower skill content.  Proponents claim rapid 
job entries are beneficial in that they reduce the fiscal drain of welfare transfers and individuals 
can then search for other jobs while in work. However, since labour is not always as mobile in 
practice as this suggests, it may also be that skills will be underutilised, higher skill vacancies 
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will more likely remain unfilled and less skilled labour will be crowded-out of the market.  The 
results may be higher levels of unemployment/underemployment, impaired productivity and a 
lowered general skills/productivity equilibrium. As such, this may generate social harm through 
lower productivity and competitiveness and through the imposition of low paid, low quality 
and insecure work; all of which are known to lead to negative consequences for physical and 
mental health, relationships and wider wellbeing (Pemberton, Sutton, & Fahmy, 2013).  It is 
notable that states with greater preference for activation (e.g. UK/US) tend to have lower 
skills/wage equilibria compared to those with more intensive training (e.g. Denmark/Sweden) 
in their ALMPs.  Moreover, inasmuch as both households and employers are likely to respond 
to these changes there may be a dampening effect on skill development, utilisation and 
technology investments. By contrast, if PES were to look to ways of upskilling the labour power 
available to employers there may be incentive effects to increase the skills content of demand.  
Management practices which focus on speeding-up job transitions may also reinforce 
responsibilisation; placing a responsibility on jobseekers to accept work rapidly, contributing 
to the stigma of being in receipt of such ‘support’. Put simply, these management practices may 
influence the political economy content of complementarity and, through this, exaggerating or 
mitigating social harm. 
 
All PES in the EU (for whom information is available), have headline indicators/targets which 
focus on transitions away from unemployment. For countries such as Denmark and Italy where 
more localised systems of targets and indicators are in place, transitions from unemployment 
are equally important and prominent among local practices.  Reinforcing this point, since the 
2008- crisis there has been a notable shift toward benefit duration indicators of various types 
(Nunn, 2012, p.19; 2013, p.16) which encourage frontline advisers to work more intensively 
with those they think they can help to move into work so as to reduce the duration of 
unemployment for specific groups of jobseekers, or overall.  These duration measures are 
associated with greater creaming and parking (Grubb, 2004; Nunn, 2012, p. 11; Nunn et al., 
2012; OSB Consulting & Synthesis Forschung, 2007; Synthesis Forschung & OSB Consulting, 
2004).7  In theory it is possible to create baskets of targets and indicators designed to balance 
out such negative incentives, few PES utilise measures such as ‘skills gained’, ‘prevention of 
unemployment’, ‘quality of employment’ or other kinds of counter-weights to measures 
promoting immediate employment outcomes.  
 
There is evidence that such measures encourage disciplinary outcomes for individuals and 
generate wider social harm.  In the US, Fording et al. (2013) find that US TANF programme 
performance measures have increased sanctioning, that sanctioning is associated with negative 
long-term outcomes, and that they are more likely to be applied to African Americans than 
white welfare clients (Schram et al., 2009).  Brodkin suggests that these effects may run ahead 
of policy intentions. She suggested even where there were provisions in policies for protecting 
the poor and vulnerable, staff frequently “limited access to benefits, provided inadequate or 
even useless work ‘supports’, ignored good cause exemptions, and delegitimated claims of 
                                                     
7 For a review of creaming and parking and other problems in the operation of PES PM, see (Nunn, 
2012, p. 8).  For a review of the various advantages and disadvantages of different types of measure see 
(Nunn, 2012, p. 13, Table 2).   
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individual need…” (2011:i271) as a function of administrative strategies to improve resource 
efficiency and increase measured performance.   
 
In the UK, while there is no formal measure or target for sanctions, campaigners have often 
complained about this.  This is because among the suite of (48+) ‘benchmarks’ that local 
managers can use to understand and manage staff, sanctions are present and also because 
occasionally local level managers invent their own administrative measures (Nunn & Devins, 
2012). These are not national ‘targets’, but the data infrastructure is there for local level use, 
and informal messages about under-performance in the system might encourage their use as 
lower level managers respond to higher level pressure to improve performance on other targets. 
The introduction of these measures coincided with wider austerity and it is notable that the 
number of welfare sanctions rose substantially (Edmiston, 2017) and that there is variation over 
time and space in the use of sanctions.  Taken together this suggests that localised management 
processes rather than national policy or jobseeker behaviour were the cause of rising sanctions 
(National Audit Office, 2016).  Such sanctions cause substantial social harm; pushing people 
into lower paid work, poverty and leading to negative mental and physical health outcomes for 
those affected. Sanctions have also been associated in other studies with the rise in food bank 
use (Loopstra et al., 2015) and a range of other impacts such as destitution and homelessness 
(Watts et al., 2014).  Research on the experience of poverty and dependence on welfare has 
repeatedly suggested interactions between PES staff and benefit claimants inside jobcentres is 
part of the wider process of stigmatisation (Pemberton, Sutton, & Fahmy, 2014) which adds to 
the social harm of poverty and failure to compete. 
Concluding remarks 
Performance management in the delivery of ALMPs, through PES has significant IPE 
implications.  The design of performance management regimes reveal much about the political 
economy intentions behind policy design and delivery, and the way that performance 
management practice operates on the ground will have a substantial effect on the extent to 
which those policy intentions are met, exaggerated or frustrated.  They help to decide who gets 
what from whatever welfare the state provides, and how obligations to engage in the formal 
labour market are constructed, including how these obligations might vary for different social 
groups.  Despite this, enquiry into how ALMPs are delivered and managed, as opposed to broad 
brush stroke critiques of ‘workfare’, are surprisingly absent from IPE research. The paper 
begins to fill that gap. 
 
To do so, it draws on critical accounts of the spread of neoliberalising policy ideas and models 
– or ‘Fast Policy’ from the work of Peck, Brenner, Theodore and others. In an attempt to 
facilitate competitiveness at spatial units below the world market scale (e.g. states, regions, 
cities, neighbourhoods, households, individuals) all sorts of policy makers, consultants and 
public managers try out a range of ‘off the peg’ policy models and develop them as they seek 
to make them fit the local context, overcome problems and deal with legitimacy problems.  
Because competition generates endemic failure, there is an endless search for new and 
iteratively developed policy solutions.  Sympathetic to the formulation of these authors but 
adding considerable detail to the account in relation to managerial practices in the 
implementation of ALMPs, it is argued here that management practices follow similar 
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‘mobilities’ to policy ideas.  This is ‘Fast Management’ and just like policy, the spread of 
particular practices is facilitated by instrumental international organisations and networks.  
Significantly though, much of the activity that spreads these practices is undertaken ‘in, through 
and around’ the political apparatus of the state and appears as a depoliticised technocratic 
process, often involving public managers and consultants operating at a variety of different 
scales.  At the same time, the work that lower scale managers do in implementation becomes 
highly politicised as they negotiate the vagaries of competition and failure; contradiction laden 
environments and policy trade-offs. 
 
The particular case of performance management in labour market policy is interesting because 
it encompasses both depoliticised multi-scalar policy making and governance, and these lower 
levels of highly politicised management and implementation.  Complex and overlapping forms 
of meta-governance borrow key performance management techniques such as the use of plans 
and accountability structured around performance indicators; cyclical administrative 
monitoring; peer surveillance; mutual encouragement to coordinate policy making between the 
macro-regional scale and national or federal scales.  This increasingly turns policy making into 
a depoliticised managerial process.  At the same time, sub-nationally these same technologies 
are carried through to the scale(s) of implementation whether these be regional, local, municipal 
and so on.  At these scales though, public managers responsible for ‘making policy work’ must 
try to make people work in the formal labour market.  This is often a complex challenge, made 
more difficult by prior failures to compete which may create poverty, erode skills and 
confidence and generate a structural lack of opportunities. They may also mean that more 
rewarding opportunities are available outside of the formal labour market, in the grey or illicit 
economy.  Lower scale managers confront these problems alongside resource constraints and 
the contradictory position of rapidly changing institutional environments and frequent removal 
of other supportive services.  They must cope with this environment, using the measures 
available to them. Alongside their own personal, professional and political orientations, this 
will shape the way that they interpret and use performance management techniques, often 
altering the political economy content of policy at the frontline.  Such coping and gaming is 
central to the ways that neoliberalisation leads to path dependent localised change because it 
confronts different ‘inherited’ socio-economic conditions on the ground.  The way that 
managerial processes such as performance management are used in policy implementation may 
significantly amplify or mitigate social harm, and are central to struggles between higher and 
lower scale policy makers and managers.  A focus on performance management in policy 
implementation can reveal the real rather than rhetorical objectives of policy, and the ways it is 
implemented can reveal whether these objectives are realised or not.   
 
The way this operates in relation to ALMPs shows a continual tendency to strengthen pressures 
for jobseekers to actively seek work and to move into employment faster, with political 
economy implications resulting from weakened matching between labour supply and demand.  
The promotion of rapid employment transitions is one of the concrete mechanisms by which 
structural pressures to compete in the global political economy are translated via management 
practices to frontline public service staff and to individuals and households who are 
‘beneficiaries’ of their services.  Their responses to these managerial technologies – which are 
shaped by extant social and institutional conditions - generate the complex, path dependent and 
messy realities of neoliberalisation on the ground, both reinforcing and variegating the 
structural tendency toward competitiveness. 
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As the discussion above suggests, performance measures with a neoliberalising political 
economy content may strengthen the pressure for policy implementation to result in significant 
social harm (Fording, Schram, & Soss, 2013; Soss, Fording, & Schram, 2011).  However, the 
variation in practice within patterns of convergence, suggests a site where there is scope for 
critical engagement and impact. Studies in contexts outside of ALMP implementation find that 
local management and implementation might be a site of contestation and subversion of 
neoliberalising initiatives (Hargreaves et al., 2018; Barnes and Prior, 2009; Dobson, 2015).  
Managerialism may literally shape the management of social harm.  Engaging with managerial 
techniques should therefore not just be a matter of observation and explanation for critical IPE 
scholars.  Within the patterns of convergence suggested above, there is scope to influence the 
design and content of performance indicators so that they have more or less disciplinary 
content. Promoting more egalitarian policy objectives also requires control.  Evidence suggests 
that part of what influences this is the nature of the actors involved.  ‘Inclusive governance’ 
(Nunn, 2018) practices which seek to open up the often closed and superficially technocratic 
processes of lower scale setting, monitoring, management and revision of performance 
indicators, to consciously re-politicise them, may offer the opportunity to influence the political 
economy content of policy implementation.  It is true that such moves may remain piecemeal 
and contingent.  However, because of the open and co-evolutionary nature of inter-penetrating 
scalar relations, many reflective micro-scale routines of opposition and coping might 
themselves add up to challenging systemic processes of neoliberalisation.  As such, it is 
essential that research in critical IPE devote greater attention to management practice and to 
the ways in which these techniques and technologies might be better understood, contested and 
utilised to challenge and divert the messy and contingent processes of neoliberalisation and 
social harm. 
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